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Offensive Explosion: An Analysis of Trends in Hitting Production in
Major League Baseball
By Laura Schreck & Eric Sickles

Abstract
2014 was a record year for pitchers followed by an abrupt reversal in trends with
offensive numbers increasing steadily in 2015 and 2016, culminating with a record-setting year
for hitters in 2017. This article explores similar offensive explosions throughout the history of
Major League Baseball in order to draw parallels to the current extraordinary increase in offense.
Evidence of this increase is provided by analyzing the trends of ten separate statistical categories,
as well as the statistical trends of the top forty hitters, and twenty pitchers in Major League
Baseball. This analysis and research provides the context for discussing possible reasons for such
a profound offensive explosion; from steroid use to possibly tampering with the manufacturing
of the baseball itself, this article discusses the implications of a dramatically changing baseball
landscape where offense reigns supreme.

Introduction
1968 was considered the “year of the pitcher,”because of a league-wide statistics for
batting average (AVG), on-base percentage (OPS), home runs per game (HR/G), earned run
average (ERA), walks and hits per inning pitched (WHIP), and bases on balls per game (BB/G)
the had never been as low. Forty-six years later, baseball pundits lauded 2014 as a second
coming as offensive stats returned to the abysmal level of those in 1968; pitchers once again
claimed the year. The glaring difference between 1968 and 2014 however, is that the original
year of the pitcher in 1968 was intrinsically anomalous. In other words, there was no significant
trend that would lead one to infer such a dramatically favorable year for pitchers. In 1969,

statistics generally returned to a level more reflective of those and 1967 and before. The cause
may have been the MLB making the decision to lower the mound height to the contemporary ten
inches. On the other hand, there is clearly a pitcher friendly trend in the leading years that hits its
apex of pitcher dominance in 2014. Indeed, data from the past ten years show a trend that favors
pitchers in several different measures of pitcher efficiency – batting average (AVG), earned run
average (ERA), home runs allowed (HR), walks and hits per innings pitched (WHIP), on base
plus slugging percentage (OPS), bases on balls per game (BB/G), and runs per game (R/G).
This begs the question: What can account for the the trends that favors the pitcher up to
2014 and its abrupt reversal in 2015? Notably, Robert Manfred became Commissioner in 2015
and baseballs used in Major League games and manufactured by Rawlings needed to be
redesigned in order to accommodate his signature. This redesign was not intended to otherwise
alter the ball, yet still, Manfred joked, “Actually, if there is a surge in offense, we’ll all be
happy” (Waldstein, 2015).  Manfred’s wish was manifested in the 2015, 2016, and 2017 seasons.
As the 2017 season set record offensive numbers raising additional questions about the baseballs,
pitcher Justin Verlander stated, “I know Mr. Manfred said the balls haven’t changed, but I think
there’s enough information out there to say that’s not true. Whether he has the say-so or not, I
don’t know” (Kernan, 2017).

Literature Review
Despite Commissioner Manfred “joking” about a surge in offense, MLB executives have
had the goal of increasing offensive output since the game's infancy. Green (2011) describes
professional baseball executives’ first efforts at increasing offensive production. In 1884, the

Chicago White Stockings played at Lake Front Park where the fences were just under 200 feet
from home plate. As if playing in a park smaller than a standard Little League field wasn’t
enough to substantially increase power statistics, the organization made the decision to count
balls hit over the fence as home runs rather than doubles. This resulted in tripling the number of
home runs from the previous year. From this point on, home runs would increase consistently
until their 19th century peak of 760 home runs in 1890 (Green, 2011).
Perhaps the most comprehensive research done on the topic of offensive potency in
professional baseball was done by David Vincent in his book Home Run: The Definitive History
of Baseball’s Ultimate Weapon. In Vincent’s work, he outlines the effect of several rule changes
in the 1920’s that greatly impact offensive production. The 19th century, affectionately referred
to as the “Dead Ball Era,” ended with Roger Conner atop the career leaders in home runs with
just 138. Despite this, prior to the 1920 season, league-wide home run production had been
significantly lower than home run production in the prior century. This led to three rule changes
before the 1920 season that aimed to increase offensive production in order to balance out the
dominance of “dead ball” pitching and defense. The first of these rules was judging whether a
home run was fair or foul not by where the ball landed, but by where it crossed over the fence.
This revolutionary rule did not last long however, on June 25, 1920, with under 60 games played,
the rule was changed back to its 1919 version, thus returning the judgement of a home run by
where it “disappears from view” (Vincent, 2006). The rule would not return again to its present
form until 1928.
The second rule change affected the way that walk-off home runs were scored.
Previously, only the number of bases needed to score a run would be awarded. In other words, if

the game was tied and a runner was on second base, a ball hit out of the park became a double,
since, when the runner on second scored, the game ended (Vincent 2006). This new rule allowed
walk-off home runs to be scored as such. Interestingly though, Babe Ruth is the only player that
hit a would be walk off home run prior to 1920, and also hit one in 1920.
The third, and perhaps, most hitter friendly rule change in 1920 was the elimination of
“trick pitches” such as spitballs, or mudballs. This rule would evolve to allow registered
spitballers to be grandfathered in to continue to be allowed to throw such pitches. Though these
rules have had long term effects on the level of offensive production since their 1920’s
conception, one key change to the game of baseball was fundamental when looking to the cause
of the 1920’s power boom: the baseball.
The “Live Ball” era of baseball began in 1920 when baseball manufacturers began
importing a higher quality wool from Australia, allowing the baseballs to be more tightly wound.
This change in the manufacturing process made the balls more elastic and thus allowed them to
travel farther. This new baseball resulted in the home run production rate more than doubling in
just ten years from 1920 to 1930 (Vincent, 2006).
 Similar to 1920, 2015 saw a several rule changes prior to the start of the season.
However, where the 1920’s rule changes were specifically designed to increase offensive
production, 2015’s rule changes were focused primarily on increasing the pace of play. This
contrasts the previously mentioned rule change in 1969 that lowered the mound in an explicit
effort to increase offense. The efforts to increase the pace of play were done by adding a clock to
que hitters and pitchers alike as to when an at-bat is to begin (similarly to a play clock in
football). Players would also allegedly be fined if they removed both feet from the batter’s box

during an at-bat, though little evidence can be found regarding how much, or how frequently,
players have been fined for such offenses. A minor amendment to the existing instant replay
rules was also added, stating that managers would no longer be required to leave the dugout in
order to challenge a play. Less specific to pace of play alterations, Major League Baseball did
increase the number of challengeable plays, as well as allowing managers to keep their
challenges after every overturned call, rather than the pre-2015 version of the rule that stated
managers would only keep their challenge after one overturned call (MLB, 2015).
 If one were to disregard pace of play, then naturally another 1920’s strategy to increase
the game’s offense may be presented, the ball itself. The issue of a “live ball” or a “juiced ball”
came into question again when the season of 1987 yielded unprecedented production with the
bats. Infamously named the “Rabbit Ball Year”, the conspiracy of a juiced ball gained so much
steam that the MLB conducted their own internal tests to determine whether or not their
baseballs had been tampered with in the hopes of increased offense output. Not surprisingly,
despite the unusually high level of offense, the MLB concluded that there was nothing unusual,
or “juiced” about the baseballs at that time (Moore, 2016).
In what is the most contemporary examination of the MLB’s possible attempt to increase
offense, Lindbergh and Lichtman (2017) mention that in 2015, Rob Manfred took the reigns as
MLB Commissioner from Bud Selig. By the time the second half of the 2015 season rolled
around in mid-July, Manfred had implemented a new baseball, altered slightly to accommodate
his signature that was larger than Bud Selig’s. While this change was allegedly only cosmetic,
there is no denying that in the second half of the season, offensive production increased
intensely. Strikingly similar to 1987, the MLB conducted yet another internal investigation to

determine if the Manfred baseball was indeed made to launch. Again, similarly to 1987, in 2015
the BRC and MLB alike both determined that not only were the baseballs not juiced, but they
were in fact 95% confident that the results were comparable to previous compliance data
(Lichtman & Lindbergh, 2017).
Still, another possible explanation for the increased amount of home runs specifically that
many scholars point to is the “new age” style of hitting where emphasis is placed on fly balls. In
theory, more fly balls would translate to more home runs given the fact that a ball must have
certain amount of loft to carry enough distance to get over the fence. This would explain the
dramatic increase in home runs, if more fly balls were in fact being hit. In reality, 2015 actually
saw a lower percent of fly balls hit compared to 2014 (Fangraphs, 2017).
Further, Lickman and Lindbergh (2017) they make considerable note that in addition to
the Baseball Research Center and MLB’s independent study, Washington State University
conducted their own study to determine if the coefficient of restitution (COR) measurements,
essentially a measure of a baseball’s bounciness, were truly different. The study found that
Manfred’s new baseball traveled, on average, and additional 7.1 feet. (Lichtman & Lindbergh,
2017).
Where the previous research has provided substantial explanation of previous instances
where the MLB has made efforts to increase the offensive aspect of America’s Pastime, our own
research hopes to shed light on the current rise in offense that has greatly affected the game of
baseball.

Method

Using data on pitcher efficiency from 2004-2017, we ran one sample t-tests to determine
the likelihood that the 2014 data represented an outstanding year for pitching. We examined four
key statistics using one sample t-tests for the 20 top performing pitchers and five for top 40
performing batters in 2014 to see if the same trends held true for their performance as was
generally seen in the entire league.

Data
We gathered statistical data measuring league-wide pitcher performance between 2004
and 2017 in seven key areas - ERA, R/G, HR, WHIP, AVG, OPS, and BB/G, - from
baseballreference.com. The league-wide data gathered begins in 2004 in order to best reflect the
period of statistical honesty that follows the “Steroid Era” of the early, to mid-2000’s; which
included offensive production that skyrocketed as a result of illegal use of performance
enhancing drugs. Additional data examined included data from the top 20 pitchers and top 40
hitters of 2014 as determined by WAR to determine whether trends for all players had an equal
impact on the statistics of top performers as well as the home run by pitch type from
baseballsavant.com.

Results
Earned runs represent runs charged to the pitcher scaled to nine innings pitched and is an
indicator of pitcher efficiency (see Figure 1).

Figure 1: Earned Run Average, 2004-2017

One sample t-tests (p < 0.0001) indicated a significant difference in ERA in 2014
compared to the 2004-2017 sample.
On-base plus slugging percentage is yet another way to examine whether batters make it
on base along with slugging as a percentage rather than scaled by innings (see Figure 2).
Figure 2: On Base plus Slugging Percentage, 2004-2017

One sample t-tests (p < 0.0001) indicated a significant difference in OPS in 2014
compared to the 2004-2017 sample.
Total home runs measure how often the ball is being hit out of the ball park, a moment
when the batter completely bests the pitcher (see Figure 3).
Figure 3: Home Runs, 2004-2017

One sample t-tests (p < 0.0001) indicated a significant difference in HR in 2014
compared to the 2004-2017 sample. A time series analysis shows a break in the data between
2014 and 2015.
Runs per game is another way to examine pitcher efficiency through how many runs are
being scored scaled to games (see Figure 4).

Figure 4: Runs/Game, 2004-2017

One sample t-tests (p < 0.0001) indicated a significant difference in HR/Hit Allowed in
2014 compared to the 2004-2017 sample.
The home run to hit allowed ratio offers further detail of pitcher efficiency as it
represents home runs as a proportion of total hits allowed (see Figure 5).
Figure 5: Home Runs per Hits Allowed, 2004-2017

One sample t-tests (p < 0.0001) indicated a significant difference in HR/Hit Allowed in
2014 compared to the 2004-2017 sample. Moreover, the graph shows the same trend of steadily
decreasing between 2004 and 2014 with a reversal of this trend between 2014 and 2015.
WHIP represents the walks and hits per inning pitched and serves as yet another marker
of a pitcher’s dominance over batters in terms of keeping them off base (see Figure 6).
Figure 6: Walks and Hits per Innings Pitched, 2004-2017

One sample t-tests (p < 0.0001) indicated a significant difference in WHIP in 2014
compared to the 2004-2017 sample.
Bases on balls per game show how often the runner is allowed on base by the pitcher’s
failure to throw strikes that the batter does not swing at. It is also a measure of the plate
discipline of the hitters (see Figure 7).

Figure 7: Bases on Balls per Game, 2004-2017

One sample t-tests (p < 0.0001) indicated a significant difference in BB in 2014
compared to the 2004-2017 sample.
There are several factors to be considered that cannot account for either the anomaly of
2014 or the reversal of the trends favoring pitching in 2015.
The only ballpark to change its dimensions in 2015 was Citi Field, bringing in the right
field fence by 10 feet; while this did result in 38 additional home runs, it represents only 5% of
the 723 run increase in 2015 and the additional 701 in 2016. Admittedly, this change in
dimensions was brought about due to analytics which suggested this shift would result in more
home runs for the Mets (Rohan, 2014). While changing dimensions of ballparks to increase
offensive production for the home team may be the next frontier in analytics, this cannot explain
the offensive explosion of 2015. Likewise, Marlins Park was adjusted to create more offense,
bringing in the center field fence by 11 feet and lowering walls (Frisaro, 2015). In 2017, the
Braves moved from Turner Field to the newly opened SunTrust Park. The dimensions of
SunTrust compared to Turner Field are 5 feet shorter in left center, 15 feet shorter in right center,

and 5 feet closer in the right field corner with the decreased dimensions of right field
compensated for by a seven and a half foot higher wall.
Some pundits have suggested that the increasing number of home runs in 2015, 2016, and
2017 can be attributed to hitters catching up to the increasing velocity of pitchers. To examine
this theory, home runs as a percentage of pitch type are examined (see Table 1).
Table 1: Home Runs as a Percentage of Pitch Type, 2009-2017
Fastball HR

Slider HR

Changeup HR

Sinker HR

Curve Ball HR

2017

0.8908%

0.8095%

0.9129%

0.8375%

0.6235%

2016

0.8325%

0.7669%

0.8583%

0.7316%

0.5887%

2015

0.7483%

0.6356%

0.7391%

0.6769%

0.5548%

2014

0.6217%

0.5858%

0.6736%

0.5461%

0.4827%

2013

0.7017%

0.6484%

0.7273%

0.5875%

0.4682%

2012

0.7422%

0.6808%

0.8068%

0.6519%

0.4978%

2011

0.6745%

0.6279%

0.7089%

0.6515%

0.4152%

2010

0.6828%

0.6025%

0.7132%

0.6252%

0.5350%

2009

0.7653%

0.6541%

0.7571%

0.6725%

0.4845%

In 2015, 2016, and 2017, there are increases in the percentage hit in every pitch type; the
increase is not limited to fast balls. One-sample t-tests reveal that 2017 was a statistically
significant anomalous year for every pitch type: fastball (p<0.0006), slider (p<0.004), changeup
(p<0.0005), sinker (p<.0003), and curveball (p<0.0011).
Data regarding the percentage of home runs per fly ball thrown do not mirror the trends
seen in the other data. The increase in 2015, 2016, and 2017 suggests that balls are traveling
farther (see Figure 8).
Figure 8: Home Run/Fly Ball Percentage, 2004-2017

Interestingly, the swinging strike percentage has also been trending upward every year
since 2010 (see Figure 9). The data does not follow the same trend negating the possibility that
batters began offering at more pitches since 2014; likewise, strikeouts have increased steadily
since 2005 (see Figure 10).
Figure 9: Swinging Strike Percentage, 2004-2016

Figure 10: Strikeouts Percentage, 2004-2017

To examine whether the trends seen across all of Major League Baseball hold true for the
top performing pitchers, AVG, WHIP, ERA, and HR/9 data was collected for the top 20 pitchers
of 2014 as determined by WAR values (see Table 2).
Table 2: Top 20 Pitchers of 2014 Performance, 2014-2017
AVG

WHIP

ERA

HR/9

2014

.229

1.09

2.77

.654

2015

.235

1.17

3.23

.904

2016

.238

1.18

3.56

1.075

2017

.232

1.17

3.66

1.132

This data reveals negligible increases in opponent AVG (and WHIP suggesting
consistency in these elite pitchers’ effectiveness based on one sample t-tests. However, there is a
marked increase in ERA (p < 0.0314) and HR/9 (p < 0.0305) within this group of elite pitchers
that is likely not due to chance fluctuations from one season to the next.

Similarly, to examine whether the trends seen across all of Major League Baseball hold
true for the top performing hitters, AVG, OBP, OPS, HR, and SO data were collected for the top
40 hitters of 2014 as determined by WAR values (see Table 3).
Table 3: Top 40 Hitters of 2014, 2014-2017
AVG

OBP

OPS

HR

SO

2014

0.291

0.362

0.833

20.10

106.38

2015

0.275

0.344

0.797

18.45

93.38

2016

0.270

0.344

0.792

20.63

104.35

2017

0.267

0.349

0.792

19.45

90.58

Data from the hitters does not show the same trends as the data from the pitchers. In fact,
it shows slight decreases which may well be due to chance based on one-sample t-tests

Discussion
The data shows a clear trend between 2004-2014 of increasing pitcher dominance. This
trend is abruptly reversed in 2015, most remarkably in the category of home runs.
Certain explanations can be dismissed based on the data available.  The changing
dimensions of the two ballparks, Citi Field and Marlins Park, and switch from Turner Field to
SunTrust Park, are not sufficient to explain the offensive increases of the past three seasons. This
leads to look to the plausible explanations based on previous increases in offense.  Historically,
home runs have increased for three reasons: rule change, use of steroids, and changes in the
baseball itself.
There have been no rule changes in 2015, 2016, and 2017 that would increase offense as
rule changes pertained to pace of play.

Major League Baseball only releases results results of failed steroid exams. Details of
which players are tested and what the test specifically screens for are not released. Given the
sudden improvement in hitting performance, performance enhancing substances as an
explanation cannot be dismissed out of hand. Fewer players have been suspended for failed
testing between 2015-2017 than between 2012-2014 (Verducci, 2017).  However, insufficient
data is available to make any claims beyond commenting that this is a possible explanation for
the significant increase in offense.
Measures of plate discipline - bases on balls, swinging strikes percentage, and strikeouts do not suggest that there has been an increase in batters’ skills in this area. Given that plate
discipline does not seem to be increasing, the bases on balls coupled with increasing home runs
and earned runs suggests pitcher control is decreasing. Such a statistically significant shift in
pitcher control is likely not due to an overall decrease in pitching skill. Home runs are up on
every pitch type so increased velocity is not a likely explanation.
The performance of the top 20 pitchers of 2014 is illuminating as to the changes that have
occurred. Their opponent average and WHIP have remained steady but there was been a
statistically significant increase in their ERA and HR/9. They remain equally effective at keeping
the ball out of play; the only difference is that the balls are travelling out of the park (ie. they are
travelling a greater distance). The Washington State University study that suggested that the new
baseballs, on average, travelled an additional 7.1 feet, could explain this phenomenon.
Additionally, the top 40 hitters of 2014 actually show a non-significant decrease in performance
between 2014 and 2017.

Given the shift in the numbers, it is not possible to ignore what the players, particularly
the pitchers, are saying. Cy Young winning pitcher Justin Verlander stated, “So on one hand you
can have somebody say that manufactures the ball, they’re not different. And on the other hand
you can say that the people that have held a ball in their hand their entire life, saying it’s
different, you value one over the other. You take your pick. (Kernan, 2017). While Rawlings
does insist that they continue to manufacture the balls within the specified parameters, this does
not preclude a shift in the average. That is to say it is possible for a ball to still fall within the
acceptable parameters can still favor one end of the spectrum such that it will travel further.

 Conclusion
Having examined multiple possible explanations, the historical record offers the best
potential explanations for what is clearly and offensive surge with the increase in homeruns
being most notable. It is no secret that the Commissioner of Baseball has made increased offense
a goal. The data supports that offense has increased in ways not due to changes in rules or
dimensions. This leaves the explanations of steroid usage or a change in the composition of the
baseballs.
Ultimately, Major League Baseball can choose to make changes to promote offense in
order to make the sport more marketable and appeal to a larger audience. In the past, these
changes have been made with transparency. It is not necessarily wrong to alter the baseball to
promote offense but if such a change has occurred, there are significant implication for teams. To
remain competitive, they will need to change their approach in building a team. Alternately,
teams built around pitching
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